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I. Introduction: Legal enigma and the ethos of deconstruction  
 
This paper is an attempt to summarise and rationalise three dominant academic 
discourses related to the critical appraisal of freedom of expression, stemming from 
postmodern jurisprudence, from a transatlantic perspective. This type of conceptualisation of 
free speech was initially almost exclusively pertinent to the American legal debate. However, 
in recent years postmodern narratives have also begun to actively penetrate the rhetoric of 
European jurisprudence. Race, gender, and sexual orientation are the respective 
deconstructionist markers of these legal movements; namely, critical race theory, feminist 
jurisprudence, and queer or ‘LGBT’1 legal discourse.  
 
In their introductory article for a compilation of the texts reflecting the impact of 
Derrida’s déconstruction on legal writings, the authors aptly observe that the scholars who 
associate themselves with post-structuralism, and especially the representatives of the critical 
legal movement, are perceived in legal academia as “cranks and nihilists”, if not as outright 
betrayers of positive law.2 However, more conservative scholars who adhere to the neutrality 
of law often disregard the fact that law in general -especially common law, and even more so 
American constitutional law- is inherently uncertain and inadequately ‘textualised’ and that it 
leaves much room for all sorts of aenigmata iuris; namely, a spectre, a figure of the absent 
and invisible or, more simply, distant cause. In this sense, the term deconstruction appears 
without direct reference to Jacques Derrida as a “talisman, either of heresy, or of enigma and 
truth”.3 Recently, Peter Goodrich demonstrated that for deconstructionist purposes, legal 
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 A conventional acronym referring collectively to four sexual identities: lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual.  
2
 P. GOODRICH, F. HOFFMANN, M. ROSENFELD and C. VISMAN, Derrida and Legal Philosophy, 
Macmillan, 2008, pp. 7-14; B. MATHEWS, “Why Deconstruction Is Beneficial”, Flinders Journal of Law 
Reform, 2000, pp. 105-126; E. WEBER, “Deconstruction Is Justice”, SubStance, 2005, pp. 38-43. 
3
 P. GOODRICH, F. HOFFMANN, M. ROSENFELD and C. VISMAN, Derrida and Legal Philosophy, o.c., 
p. 7.   
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enigmas are akin to the residue of forgotten histories, references to lost texts, and marks left 
by encounters between the law and its now marginal literary and poetic sources.4  
 
Taking up this assumption of legal enigmas and embracing the ethos of 
deconstruction, this paper inquires into the rhetorical strategies of postmodern jurisprudence 
with regard to freedom of expression. In the last twenty years, critical scholars have 
essentially instrumentalised the right to free speech. This paper puts in light the semantic 
modes involved into this process. Instrumentalisation, under such an assumption, is not fully 
synonymous with deconstruction. The former invokes a rhetorical construct of freedom of 
speech as a right that is created, interpreted or enforced in certain socially established ways 
and through the use of recognised procedures and agencies. Most importantly, 
instrumentalisation does not necessarily bear the somewhat negative connotation it is 
associated with in ethics, akin to an (ab-)use of something or someone for one’s own agenda.5 
Consequently, freedom of speech permits several modes of instrumentalisation, including 
deconstruction, depending on the interpretative conventions and agencies. Thus, the primary 
mode of instrumentalisation employed by the US Supreme Court positions the speakers as the 
main agents, whereas critical jurisprudence suggests a rhetorical shift towards the victims. 
Despite the fact that the critical legal academia is not as distinct in Europe, these rhetorical 
strategies will also pave the way for the instrumentalisation of free speech in the European 
environment, giving a voice to the enigmas of legal neutrality.  
 
Subsequently, the central arguments of these three movements are addressed with 
regard to freedom of expression. Therefore, the structure of this article is simply organised to 
illustrate the somewhat modestly known, at least in Europe, rhetorical technique of critical 
race theory; followed by what is perhaps the most widely acknowledged tradition of feminist 
                                                 
4
 In Ancient rhetoric, an enigma is an obscure allegory, an opaque citation or ambiguous reference. The term 
later became understood as referring to a foreign, absent or forgotten source. Under the assumption of legal 
neutrality, the law speaks from the space of truth and truth is variously defined as something unseen, unsaid and 
that one can probably not say. It is mystery, enigma, riddle, and invisible cause. Referring to the oeuvre of the 
Spanish legal philologist Antonio de Nebruja, Enigmas of the Civil Law, Goodrich suggests that enigmas of civil 
law were perceived as misinterpretations, obscurities and paradoxes that could be explained, if not necessarily 
resolved, at a syntactical level through correct translation and at an interpretative level by returning to Greek and 
Latin sources, to the context and intention of earlier authors whose works were either cited or implicitly invoked 
in the letter of the law. See: P. GOODRICH, “Legal Enigmas: Antonio de Nebrija, ‘The Da Vinci Code’ and the 
Emendation of Law”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2010, pp. 71-99. 
5
 In this sense, instrumentalisation covers legal spaces beyond legislature and judgements. Roger Cotterrell 
observes that “law as institutionalised doctrine can be found outside the ‘official’ legal system of the state” and 
that “law, in some sense, may flourish in social sites and settings where lawyers or police never venture”. See: R. 
COTTERRELL, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory, Ashgate, 2006, p. 1.  
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jurisprudence; and completing with the ever-active narratives of queer legal discourse. Lastly, 
the conclusion shall assess some controversies and underline the value of critically 
deconstructing and rhetorically instrumentalising the right to free speech for Europe.  
 
II. Critical race theory  
 
“Everywhere the crosses are burning,  
sharp-shooting good-steppers around every corner, 
there are snipers in the schools… 
I know you don’t believe this.  
You think this is nothing 
but faddish exaggeration. But they 
are not shooting at you.”6 
 
This is one of the numerous quotations included in an article by Mari J. Matsuda,7 an 
American lawyer, critical race scholar, and activist of Asian descent who is currently a law 
professor at the University of Hawaii. The emergence of critical race theory dates back to the 
mid-1980s, when a group of legal scholars of colour produced a body of related scholarship, 
and developed a sense of group identity. Critical race theory drew its seminal inspiration from 
the civil rights movement of the 1960s, which had revealed that dominant conceptions of race, 
racism, and equality failed to provide a “meaningful quantum of racial justice”.8 A boycott 
organised by several students of colour at Harvard Law School9 and an alternative course on 
“race, racism and American law”10 finally shaped this sense of “critical race” as a paradigm of 
academic identity.  
 
                                                 
6
 L.D. CERVANTES, “Poem for the Young White Man Who Asked Me How I, An Intelligent Well Read 
Person Could Believe in the War Between Races”, in Emplumada, 1981. 
7
 See: Matsuda’s Chapter in M.J. MATSUDA, C.R. LAWRENCE III, R. DELGADO and K.W. 
CRENSHAW, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment, 
Westview, 1993, pp. 17-53, especially p. 24; M.J. MATSUDA, “Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering 
the Victim’s Story”, Michigan Law Review, 1989, pp. 2320-2381.   
8
 M.J. MATSUDA et al., Words That Wound, o.c., p. 3.  
9
 After the first Afro-American professor, Derrick Bell, left Harvard Law School, only two professors of colour 
remained there.  
10
 Leading scholars and practitioners of colour were invited each week to lecture and lead some discussion on a 
chapter from Bell’s books. Some of the free speech critical race theory pioneers were students at that time, like 
Matsuda and Crenshaw; the others were invited as guest-lectures, like Delgado and Lawrence. See, for a genesis 
and current state of this legal movement: K.W. CRENSHAW, “The First Decade: Critical Reflections, or A 
Foot in the Closing Door”, UCLA Law Review, 2001-2002, pp. 1342-1372.  
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Critical race theory emphasises the socially constructed nature of race, suggests that 
judicial conclusions are the result of power imbalances and opposes the continuation of all 
forms of subordination. It is usually classified as a branch of critical legal studies and as 
related to issues of power discrimination, such as class, gender, colour, and sexuality. Highly 
influential scholars in this area include Derrick Bell, Gloria Ladson-Billings, Neil Gotanda, 
William Tate, Adrienne Dixson, Celia Rousseau, and Thandeka Chapman. As far as free 
speech critical race theory is concerned, perhaps the most noteworthy contributions belong to 
Richard Delgado, Charles R. Lawrence, Mari Matsuda, Jean Stefancic, and Kimberlé 
Williams Crenshaw. Most of these scholars contributed to the leading piece of reference in the 
field; that is, Words That Wound.11  
 
The very title ‘Words That Wound’ suggests that the authors view expression as a 
speech act of a perfomative nature, even though they do not frame it explicitly as part of 
speech acts theory.12 Thus, free speech critical race theory is based on the assumption that 
particular types of speech can be harmful to minorities. The emotional distress provoked by 
hate speech includes offence, uncertainty, discomfort and loss of dignity. If the state fails to 
protect a vulnerable minority from hate speech, it is in fact failing to provide proper security 
to its citizens. Free speech critical race theory targets the severe psychological trauma suffered 
by members of identifiable groups. These scholars claim that the US Supreme Court is so 
convinced of the value of the marketplace of ideas13 that it does not take proper notice of the 
right to speech and non-discrimination as invoked by protection from racial segregation 
through the First Amendment. The epistemological skepticism of the Supreme Court and its 
belief in the absence of absolute truth beyond the clear and present danger test, which requires 
                                                 
11
 A somewhat different but substantially close position from the Jewish perspective is defended in A. THESIS, 
Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements, New York University 
Press, 2002.  
12
 The discussion on the illocutionary and perlocutionary effect of hate speech is rooted into the speech acts 
theory, introduced by J.L. Austin in How to Do Things with Words, who elaborated the theory of perfomative 
acts. The concept was further essentially developed by J.R. Searle in Speech Acts. See, for a referential analysis 
of hate speech and pornography through the methodology of speech acts: J. BUTLER, Excitable Speech: A 
Politics of the Performative, Routledge, 1997. See also: W. SADURSKI, “On ‘Seeing Speech Through an 
Equality Lens’: A Critique of Egalitarian Arguments for Suppression of Hate Speech and Pornography”, Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1996, pp. 713-723; who, in his critique of MacKinnon’s arguments, focuses on speech 
acts theory with regard to pornography and hate speech and brings in the argument that illocution is effective 
when the intention is recognised by one listener.  
13
 The marketplace of ideas is a metaphorical concept introduced into the legal discourse in 1919, in Justice 
Holmes’s renowned dissent in Abrams v. United States. Its theoretical foundations date back to John Milton’s 
Aeropagitica and John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty. See: United States Supreme Court, Abrams v. United States, 
1919, 250 US 616; which develops that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in 
the marketplace of ideas”. See also, for a critical account: A.I. GOLDMAN and J. C. COX, “Speech, Truth, 
and the Free Market for Ideas”, Legal Theory, 1996, pp. 1-32.  
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protection under the First Amendment, allows the expression of nearly all kinds of speech; 
including public racial slurs, Nazi parade in a Jewish district, symbolic cross-burning in an 
Afro-American family’s front yard, and Holocaust denial.14 The marketplace of ideas is 
distorted when any group of citizens is threatened. In this sense, the value of free speech as in 
the First Amendment is symbolically juxtaposed with the rationale associated with non-
discrimination as in the Fourteenth Amendment. The discriminatory effect is attributed to an 
essentially “linguistic pain”. A speech act itself may not ‘acknowledge’ its import and yet still 
reproduce hierarchies of racial power by virtue of pure utterance, depiction or writing. This 
suggestion is equally one of the strongest and weakest points of critical race theory. Such 
power itself remains a legal enigma within positive law -an absent and invisible figure- and is 
not easy to identify or even to localise within racist speech acts. To perform this ‘voicing’ of 
linguistic pain, critical race theory develops a specific rhetoric that is suitable for 
contextualising power and marginalisation.  
 
Consequently, the distinctive feature of free speech critical race theory is a specific 
narrative, perhaps unusual for European legal scholarship, that expands pure legal arguments 
via personal histories, parables, chronicles, dreams, stories, poetry, fiction, and revisionist 
histories to convey its message. Critical race scholarship expresses scepticism about dominant 
claims regarding the neutrality, objectivity, colour blindness, and meritocracy of the law. This 
body of knowledge borrows from several academic traditions, among which are liberalism, 
law and society, Marxism, post-structuralism, pragmatism, and nationalism.  
 
What is peculiar to the critical race theory methodology is a specific rhetorical strategy 
of manifestly emotional argumentation that works on legal texts to reshape the focus and 
reveal the concealment of harm to the victims by the justices of the Supreme Court. Thus, 
Matsuda and Lawrence argue that the Court de-personalised and contextualised the act of a 
cross burning in front of an Afro-American family’s house in the case RAV, which left the 
victims voiceless.15 The Supreme Court found the local statute prohibiting symbols of racial 
segregation contradictory to the First Amendment’s rationale regarding the necessity of 
                                                 
14
 While it is clearly beyond the scope of this article to present a detailed insight into First Amendment 
jurisprudence, I develop an account of the epistemological difference between American and European 
adjudication in relation to hate speech in U. BELAVUSAU, “Judicial Epistemology of Free Speech through the 
Lenses of Ancient Rhetoric”, International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 2010, pp. 165-183. A 
representative list of hate speech cases before the US Supreme Court includes: Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 US 
250, 1952; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US 444, 1969; Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1978; RAV v. St. Paul, 505 
US 377, 1992; and Virginia v. Black et al., 538 US 343, 2003.    
15
 M.J. MATSUDA et al., Words That Wound, o.c., pp. 133-166. 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES – VOL 3 ISSUE 1 (2010) 
 150 
content neutrality in the regulation of speech. Justice Scalia’s majority opinion simply omits 
the victim’s story, limiting the reference to a “black family living in the white neighbourhood” 
to just one sentence.16 This ‘ahistorical’ and ‘atextual’ opinion must be compared with the 
representation of RAV by M. Matsuda; which perfectly exemplifies the narrative style of 
critical race theory that often balances law and fiction.  
 
“In the early morning of June 21, 1990, long after they had put their five children to bed, Russ and 
Laura Jones were awakened by voices outside their house. Russ got up, went to his bedroom window, 
and peered into the dark. ‘I saw a glow’, he recalled. There, in the middle of his yard, was a burning 
cross. The Joneses are African Americans. In the spring of 1990 they had moved into their four-
bedroom, three-bathroom dream house in St Paul, Minnesota. They were the only black family on the 
block. Two weeks after they had settled into their predominantly white neighborhood, the tires of both 
of their cars were slashed. A few weeks later one of their car windows was shattered, and a group of 
teenagers walked past their house and shouted ‘nigger’ at their nine-year-old son. And now this burning 
cross. Russ Jones did not have to guess at the meaning of this symbol of racial hatred. There is no black 
person in America who has not learned the significance of this instrument of persecution and 
intimidation, who has not had emblazoned on his or her mind the image of black men’s scorched bodies 
hanging from trees [...].”17 
 
Matsuda notes three identifying characteristics for case law analysis as a prerequisite 
for opening the “dreaded floodgates of censorship”: the message is one of racial inferiority, 
directed against a historically oppressed group and which displays a persecutory, hateful, and 
degrading character.18  
 
Based on the dominant assumption of legal neutrality, the law speaks from the space 
of truth. Critical race theory instrumentalises freedom of speech through a rhetorical mode of 
victimisation, bringing historic context, victim story-telling, and the omitted semantics of 
oppression to challenge this conception of an unmediated communication between legal text 
and reader. The aim of constructing the legal text as a piece of literature becomes a 
deconstructive bridge into the space of legal enigmas. The discursive practices of critical race 
theory scholars are, thus, comparable to the role of the literary critic. These individuals ‘trace’ 
judges who believe that their decisions emerge without mediation from the words of statutes 
or constitutional clauses. Words and language can certainly be flexible instruments of social 
                                                 
16
 RAV v. St. Paul, 505 US 377, 1992.  
17
 M.J. MATSUDA et al., Words That Wound, o.c., pp. 134-ff. 
18
 Ibid., p. 36.  
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progress; indeed, they can be instrumental in the pursuit of truth, artistic expression, human 
creativity, and political diversity. However, speech utterances are also perfect instruments of 
coercion and social constraint, a tool of abuse and intimidation that serves to bolster power 
and deepen victimisation.  
 
III. Feminist jurisprudence  
 
Critical race theory maintains that “racial oppression is experienced by many in 
tandem with oppression on grounds of gender, class, or sexual orientation”.19 Similarly, 
feminist legal scholars focus their deconstruction of law on institutionally inherited patriarchal 
structures, the subordination of women and a methodology shaped by consciousness-raising 
narratives. When discussing the influence of feminist jurisprudence on the academic discourse 
regarding freedom of expression, one can identify two topics that are of particular interest to 
feminist scholars; that is, sexist speech and pornography.    
 
As far as hate speech is concerned, feminist authors focus on the performative 
potential of speech, reproducing patriarchal schemes and codes of masculine domination 
through language. Commenting on RAV v. St Paul, MacKinnon presents a similar argument 
regarding victimisation. 
 
“Cross burning is nothing but an act, yet it is pure expression, doing the harm it does solely through the 
message it conveys. Nobody weeps for charred wood. By symbolically invoking the entire violent 
history of the Ku Klux Klan, it says: ‘Blacks go out’, thus engaging in terrorism and effectuating 
segregation. It carries the message of historic white indifference both to this message and to the 
imminent death for which it stands.”20  
 
In this respect, critical race theory and feminist jurisprudence are very much 
intersected. Feminist lawyers also argue that words and conduct work hand in hand in creating 
social oppression. Furthermore, the writings of authors like Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw can 
be connected with both movements. One particularly pressing issue that Crenshaw addresses 
is the problem of double oppression that is peculiar to women of colour in American society. 
She demonstrates the ways in which jurisprudence is constructed to make it necessary to 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., p. 6.  
20
 C. MACKINNON, Only Words, Harvard University Press, 1993.  
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choose between being black and being a woman, arguing that “separate rhetorical strategies 
that characterise antiracist and feminist politics frequently intersect in ways that create new 
dilemmas for women of colour”.21   
 
Critical race theory not only illustrates its positions via victim-story narratives but it 
also attacks concrete decisions by the Supreme Court related to hateful expressions against 
racial or national minorities. In contrast, while feminist jurisprudence advances a very strong 
position within the legal debate on pornography, its stance regarding sexist hate speech seems 
to be more superficial.22 Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, the very emphasis on the 
seminal critique of hate speech among radical feminist scholars like MacKinnon may be just a 
part of a rhetorical strategy intended to justify their critique of pornography. The specious 
nature of arguments interpreting pornography as a kind of hate speech have been convincingly 
noted by Judith Butler.23   
 
An Icelandic scholar on free speech, Herdís Thorgeirsdóttir, suggests that generally the 
mere status of women in the press is indicative of the male control of the public debate and of 
the silencing effect of discriminatory journalism, in which “women are in minority of those 
occupying editorial posts within the media, which impinges on their struggle for equality 
because of the male-biased presentation of social and political issues in the form of the 
media”.24  
 
Another important speech issue advanced by the feminist critique is sexism in writing, 
in which the masculine linguistic forms prevail over the feminine, therefore creating the effect 
of subordination through language.25  
 
Since the appearance of Only Words by Catharine MacKinnon,26 which effectively 
deconstructed the right to free speech by displaying the coercive effect of pornography on 
                                                 
21
 CRENSHAW, in M.J. MATSUDA et al., Words That Wound, o.c., p. 112.  
22
 However, some interesting insights do emerge. One curious area of focus is the discussion on campus speech 
codes. See: N.C. CORNWELL, M.P. ORBE and K.T. WARREN, “Hate Speech / Free Speech: Using 
Feminist Perspectives to Foster On-Campus Dialogue”, Journal of Intergroup Relations, 1999, pp. 3-17.    
23
 J. BUTLER, Excitable Speech, o.c., pp. 82-95. 
24
 H. THORGEIRSDÓTTIR, Journalism Worthy of the Name: Freedom within the Press and the Affirmative 
Side of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Nijhoff, 2005, p. 187.  
25
 See, among others, at the level of the Council of Europe: Recommendation No (90) on the Elimination of 
Sexism from Language; which underlines the particular role of language in the development of an individual’s 
social identity.  
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women, the feminist legal view has often been erroneously reduced to a virulent critique of 
pornography.  
 
Indeed, pornography is conceived of by feminist scholars as a socially recreated 
discourse, along with the categories of gender and sexual identity. However, whereas many 
lawyers hold the trivial view that all feminists are unanimously against pornography, 
contemporary feminist jurisprudence is deeply divided on the issue between ‘radical’ and 
‘sex-positive’ feminists.  
 
Catharine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin, Robin Morgan, Dorchen Leidholdt and 
several other feminist scholars have emphasised the peculiar stigma that the pornographic 
industry creates for women, noting that females are often explicitly subordinated -if not 
implicitly raped- to depict the popular fantasies of men. The argument stems from the critique 
of the male-centred construction of the First Amendment legislation. As Nicola Lacey phrases 
it, “the feminist critique has brought pornography into the sphere of the public and has 
insisted upon its political relevance”.27 Starting in the late 1970s, radical feminists began to 
form organisations such as Women Against Pornography that launched relevant educational 
events, including slide-shows, speeches, and guided tours of the sex industry in Times Square; 
all aimed to raise awareness of the harms of pornography.        
 
However, the feminist legal movement is far from presenting a unanimous viewpoint 
on pornography. The end of the 1980s brought the so-called ‘sex-positive’ feminists onto the 
academic scene. In the early 1990s, those feminists were followed by a third generation of 
feminist scholars and the beginning of the ‘feminist sex war’. The sex-positive feminists 
                                                                                                                                                         
26
 C. MACKINNON, Only Words, o.c. See also: A. DWORKIN, Pornography: Men Possessing Women, 
Plume, 1991; Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day for Women’s Equality, Organising Against 
Pornography, 1988. Similar examples of anti-porn attacks can be found in Europe. For instance, the German 
PorNo campaign led by a leading second-wave feminist, Alise Schwarzer, very much echoed the claims of 
MacKinnon. See: I. STOEHR, “PorNo-Kampagne und Frauenbewegung”, Zeitschrift für Sexualforschung, 
1989, pp. 199-206; A. SCHWARZER, “Weiblicher Masochismus ist Kollaboration!”, EMMA, 1991. For an 
example in the Italian context, see: A. VERZA, Il dominio pornografico, Liguori, 2006. 
27
 Lacey continues with the private-public parallel as follows: “this is both because of the interdependence 
argument -the argument that private oppression inevitably leads to public disadvantage- and because the 
traditional denomination of pornography as private can itself be shown to be disingenuous; in what might be 
called a ‘no-lose situation’ for the producers and consumers of pornography, the production of pornography is 
seen as a matter of public right and hence protected, whilst its consumption is constructed as a matter of private 
interest, and hence also protected; both public and private sides of the dichotomy are manipulated in ways which 
exclude anti-pornography arguments”. See: N. LACEY, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays on Legal and 
Social Theory, Hart, 1998, pp. 7-97. See also, for a critique of the private-public binary in human rights 
discourses: J.M. AMAYA-CASTRO, Human Rights and the Critiques of the Public-Private Distinction, Ph.D. 
Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2010; see especially, concerning feminist jurisprudence, pp. 133-177. 
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acknowledge the value of pornography as an intrinsic mode of free speech that is 
indispensable for women’s sexual liberation, therefore contradicting the fundamental ideas of 
the second-generation feminist movement. Ellen Willis’s 1981 essay, Lust Horizons: Is the 
Women’s Movement Pro-Sex?, first introduced the term ‘pro-sex feminists’. MacKinnon’s 
radical approach was severely criticised from the standpoint of free speech discourse -with 
freedom of expression reinterpreted as an important element of the emancipation movement- 
by such scholars as Ellen Willis, Susie Bright, Patrick (Pat) Califia, Gayle Rubin, Avedon 
Carol, Tristan Taormino and Camille Paglia, among others.28 The radical feminist strategy is 
likened to the campaign for censorship advocated by conservatives who were eager to 
suppress the sexual expression of women and sexual minorities.   
 
The ‘feminist sex war’ intensified at the particular moment in the US constitutional 
history in which several states tried to establish anti-pornography ordinances. One part of the 
feminist movement passionately advocated this form of suppression of the First Amendment 
for the alleged benefit of women, whereas the sex-positive feminists maintained that anti-
pornography legislation would violate women’s right to free speech. In this respect, the role of 
the second generation of (radical) feminists was the most appalling from the standpoint of art 
liberty. The group seemed to be so exited by its own hypertrophied concept of victimisation 
that scholars like Andrea Dworkin or Catharine MacKinnon advanced arguments supporting 
quasi-essentialist claims of binary moral good and wrong.  
 
Mary Joe Frug noted that the value of feminist jurisprudence is not in the destruction 
of pornography but rather in its deconstruction. 
 
“My claim that the advocates should have sought to deconstruct pornography rather than single-
mindedly seeking to destroy it [...]. If women’s oppression occurs through sex, then in order to end 
women’s oppression in its many manifestations, the way people think and talk and act about sex must 
be changed. The ordinance campaign was not well organised to change how people think and talk and 
act about sex. Rather, the ordinance advocates relentlessly utilised and exploited traditional ideas and 
language regarding sex in all aspects of the campaign.”29 
                                                 
28
 See, among others: J. BENJAMIN, “Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination”, in A. SNITOW, 
Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality, New York, pp. 460-467; A. CAROL, Nudes, Prudes and Attitudes: 
Pornography and Censorship, New Clarion, 1994; A. ASSITER and A. CAROL, Bad Girls and Dirty 
Pictures: The Challenge To Reclaim Feminism, Boulder, 1993; (in particular, G. RUBIN, “Misguided, 
Dangerous and Wrong: An Analysis of Anti-Pornography Politics”, pp. 18-40.)   
29
 M.J. FRUG, Postmodern Legal Feminism, Routledge, 1992, pp. 151-152.  
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The third generation of legal feminists usually shares the view that their predecessors 
exaggerated the dangers of pornography by focusing on the most outrageous examples of 
pornography -e.g., those of a sadomasochistic character or those simulating rape- and thus 
essentially takes a pro-speech position.30   
      
IV. Queer or LGBT legal discourse  
 
In a certain sense, feminist jurisprudence launched a discussion on gender and 
sexuality that was seminal to the deconstruction of law from the standpoint of sexual identity. 
The classic monograph by Gary Minda on Postmodern Legal Movements31 does not mention 
queer legal discourse among the five leading schools of legal postmodernism; namely, Law 
and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, Feminist Jurisprudence, and 
Law and Literature. However, since the end of the 1980s, the ever growing number of 
relevant texts that have clearly borrowed their deconstructionist strategies indicates that the 
academic discourse on LGBT rights is an important part of the critical scholarship. On this 
basis, it is particularly interesting to study the peculiar instrumentalisation of the right to free 
speech within this movement.   
 
                                                 
30
 W. McELROY, A Woman’s Right to Pornography, St Martin’s, 1997; C. MATRIX, Tales from the Clit, AK 
Press, 1996; N. STROSSEN, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women’s Rights, 
New York University Press, 2000; M. PALLY, “The Fireworks at the Sexuality Conference: Whom should 
feminist Fuck?”, New York Native, 29 May 1982; http://www.marciapally.com/Pages/fireworks.html; M. 
PALLY, Sex and Sensibility: Reflections on Forbidden Mirrors and the Will to Censor, Hopewell, Ecco Press, 
1994; Feminists Against Censorship, http://www.fiawol.demon.co.uk/FAC; N. STROSSEN, Zur Verteidigung 
der Pornographie: Für die Freiheit des Wortes, Sex und die Rechte der Frauen, Haffmans Verlag, 1997.  
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 Nonetheless, Minda himself somewhat briefly mentions that, “by the late 1980s, openly bisexual, lesbian, and 
gay legal scholarly developed gay and lesbian studies, a new form of critical discourse that has ought to correct 
the biases and inaccurate views of sexual orientation in Western legal culture” and that “the liberal discourse of 
rights in American legal institutions is said to have denied the interests and perspectives of gays and lesbians 
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The only two free speech cases before the US Supreme Court in which sexual identity 
has been at stake are Gay Olympics32 and Hurley.33 The latter case did not address hate speech 
but tackled instead the issue of free assembly, analysing whether the participation of a gay 
group in a traditional city parade could be restricted if the slogans being used by that group 
had little to do with the character of the assembly.34 By opposition, the former case addressed 
the issue of commercial speech. Since the Amateur Sport Act of 1987, the US Olympic 
Committee has held the exclusive rights to the use of Olympic designations. In 1981, it 
refused gay activists the right to entitle an international sport event the ‘Gay Olympics’. 
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, by a vote of seven against two, upheld the exclusive rights 
of the Olympic Committee. The judgement provoked an intense academic discussion on 
whether the Supreme Court was essentially influenced by homophobic prejudices.35   
 
The LGBT rights discourse, which reveals the homophobic features inherent in legal 
settings, is capable of reversing mainstream legal reasoning about the First Amendment; 
moving it in a more affirmative direction and, hence, instrumentalising the right to free 
speech. William Rubenstein demonstrates that equality for the queer community in the 
American judicial system has essentially been achieved by means of the First Amendment, 
whereas the claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment -“which are almost necessarily 
premised upon the speech acts of ‘coming out’”- have largely failed.36 Rubenstein underlines 
that the central element of the experience of the queer community in the US is “a resounding, 
deafening, mind-boggling silence”. Therefore, coming out is the most important speech act in 
the context of the legal fight for equal rights. Indeed, “because taking on a lesbian / gay 
identity involves coming out, society can oppress gay people most directly simply by ensuring 
that such expressions are silenced”.37 Similarly, anti-gay violence is essentially based on the 
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 United States Supreme Court, San Francisco Arts and Athletics Incorporated v. United States Olympic 
Committee, 483 US 522, 1987.  
33
 United States Supreme Court, Hurley et al. v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston et 
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 The Supreme Court held that the very goals and messages of the concrete assembly, St Patrick’s Parade, would 
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Olympics, and the Ownership of Language”, Entertainment and Sports Law Journal, 2006, pp. 1-12.  
36
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Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, New York University Press, 
1994, pp. 280-199, especially p. 281.  
37
 Ibid., p. 283.  
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stigma of silence because it is rarely exercised until the queer identity is revealed.38 The ethos 
of speaking out becomes, then, an essential link to the First Amendment rights in the fight 
against ‘invisibility’ in the public space. Yet, Rubenstein identifies three main limitations to 
the full realisation of First Amendment rights by the LGBT community. Firstly, the First 
Amendment is triggered only in the context of ‘state action’ and does not have any bearing on 
private censorship. Secondly, the First Amendment is mostly designed for the protection of 
political speech, whereas coming out is a personal type of public expression. Thirdly, the First 
Amendment targets “imminent lawless conduct”, and a judicial interpretation of the 
amendment’s purpose may easily focus on the noble fight against obscenity, while essentially 
restricting LGBT expression.39  
 
Rubenstein still maintains that “the First Amendment has been the only consistent 
friend of lesbian and gay rights litigators since Stonewall; with rare exceptions, when a case is 
properly framed as a First Amendment case, lesbian and gay plaintiffs prevail”.40  
 
A more recent example is the attack on the military restrictions on LGBT persons 
serving in the US army. During the period of Clinton’s ‘liberalisation’, the restriction was 
reshaped into the ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ policy.41 This policy maintains that merely being a 
homosexual does not in itself bar someone from military service but indicates that engaging in 
or possessing the propensity to engage in homosexual conduct may be. Gilreath analyses the 
military ban as reverse hate discrimination, the difference being that it silences the victims, 
who cannot express themselves through manifestation of their sexual identity.42 Similarly, 
Judith Butler deconstructs the silencing impact of this speech restriction, drawing a parallel 
between her objections and the perfomative critique of hate speech within critical race 
theory.43  
 
Referring to Lawrence v. Texas,44 in which the Supreme Court established the off-base 
private conduct of homosexual relations through absolute decriminalisation, Gilreath presents 
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 Ibid., p. 285.  
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 Ibid., p. 287.  
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 Ibid., p. 288.  
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 The modification is a result of a compromise between the Clinton administration and the Congress.  
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 S. GILREATH, “Sexually Speaking: ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ and the First Amendment after Lawrence v. 
Texas”, Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy, 2007, pp. 953-976.  
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 J. BUTLER, Excitable Speech, o.c., pp. 104-126. 
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 United States Supreme Court, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 US 558, 2003.  
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a convincing account of the attack on such discrimination from the standpoint of the First 
Amendment.45  
 
“The continuation of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’, which allegedly treats an admission of homosexual conduct 
-through expressive activity or verbal utterance- as an evidentiary indication that the speaker has the 
propensity to engage in a criminal act (‘sodomy’), when the underlying act (‘sodomy’) can no longer be 
constitutionally criminalised, shifts the focus of the policy. It now emphasises that same-sex kissing, 
hand-holding, cuddling, etc. sends the message that ‘I am gay’ and presumes an uncomfortable 
reception of that message by the majority of heterosexual soldiers. In other words, ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ 
is no longer afforded its convenient cover as a conduct-based regulation.”46  
 
The construction of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ exemplifies a specific vulnerability of the 
LGBT movement with regard to the First Amendment. The military ban forbids lesbians and 
gays from speaking in favour of their ability to live honestly and openly while serving their 
country because, as soon as they reveal their identity, they are fired. The only persons who are 
permitted to debate are, thus, heterosexuals. The potential of the LGBT discourse to influence 
judicial and legislative reasoning is arguably even stronger than that of the critical race theory. 
Ethnic groups and women, when attacked, are -at least, de iure- not silenced. Arguably, they 
can therefore respond to their opponents. Meanwhile, in the American military, lesbian and 
gay individuals are barred from fair competition in the marketplace of ideas.  
 
The American LGBT narrative reveals a curious potential for debate on so-called ‘gay 
PDA’ or legally-accepted manifestation of gay affection in public47 in Europe. More 
generally, it has the potential to challenge the academic discourse on homophobia and 
religious hate speech in Western democracies.48  
 
This perspective on gay PDA can be assessed in the light of the work of the French 
post-structuralist Pierre Bourdieu, who has illuminated the mode in which the language 
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operates through the notions of habitus and hexis.49 Bourdieu explains that an individual is 
dependent on particular systems of cultural and class signification, history and human 
memory, and shaped by a set of acquired sensibilities, dispositions and tastes. A certain 
behaviour or disposition becomes a part of a community structure even when the original 
purpose of that behaviour can no longer be recalled. Thus, habitus covers the totality of 
learned habits, bodily moves, tastes and other non-discursive practices that ‘go without 
saying’ for a particular community. Hexis, according to Bourdieu, becomes the embodiment 
of habitus;50 namely, how various social actors carry themselves through gestures and ways of 
walking, looking, sitting, sneezing, coughing and, ultimately, thinking. Among others, habitus 
and hexis bear a central importance to the visualisation of class attributes as, for instance, in 
the way people eat. The body for Bourdieu is a mnemonic device in which a group’s most 
fundamental beliefs and patterns of behaviour are embedded. The body incorporates and 
reproduces history in ways that individuals are largely unconscious of.   
 
The patterns of assumed queer behaviour involve a certain hexis -often speculatively 
stereotypical- in terms of intonation, dress and body language. Consequently, both the alleged 
queer behaviour and gay PDA perform the role of speech acts that break with the traditional 
societal habitus of hetero-normativity. Based on this socio-legal reconstruction of the 
discussion of gay PDA, queer hexis requires robust protection as part of the effort to defend 
the right to freedom of expression. The marketplace of ideas is also a merchandise of various 
hexes. The gay hexis attracts aggression from homophobes and suppression by the law 
enforcement machine, which is used to rationalise free speech based on the patriarchal 
habitus. 
 
V. Conclusions  
 
A. Language of postmodern instrumentalisation   
 
“Insoweit ist es buchstäblich richtiger zu sagen, daß die Sprache uns spricht, als daß wir sie 
sprechen.”51 
                                                 
49
 P. BOURDIEU, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, Droz, 1972, esepcially p. 282; La Distinction: Critique 
sociale du jugement, Minuit, 1979.  
50
 In fact, hexis is a Greek correlative of Latin habitus, an episteme developed by Aristotle.  
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 H.-G. GADAMER, Wahrheit und Methode, Tübingen, Mohr, 1990, p. 463; “it’s literally more correct to say 
that language speaks us than that we speak it”. 
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The legal narratives of critical race theory, feminist jurisprudence and LGBT rights 
discourse are similar to the extent that they address harm done to a vulnerable community. 
Storytelling by the victims and links to non-discrimination are distinctive features of these 
accounts of free speech.  
 
Postmodern legal scholarship opposes dominant legal narratives in a manner similar to 
that of Pierre Bourdieu, who criticises semiological analysis. This earlier structuralist 
approach draws its inspiration from Ferdinand de Saussure as ‘internal’ interpretation, later 
drawn up by Noam Chomsky, which omits the wider context composed of the socio-historical 
conditions governing the production and reception of texts, conceiving the position of the 
analyst uncritically.52 In this sense, postmodern jurisprudence reconstructs a vision of law that 
is blind to colour, gender and sex -‘law neutrality’- as a product of white male hetero-
supremacy and embedded legal patterns of power abuse. By their interpretative strategies, 
critical scholars illuminate both the context and the identity of the analyst, moving beyond the 
internal rhetorical wording of legal texts. The ‘traditional’ (structural) academic discourse 
uses specific language that deviates from an original language through the exclusion of 
common, ordinary, dramatic or vulgar usages. Postmodern legal narrative either re-establishes 
the original language or decodes the traces of the excluded original language that remain 
within juridical texts; thus, revealing new aenigmatae iuris.  
 
Postmodern movements entail an anti-essentialist approach to human identities. Race, 
gender roles and sexual identity are seen as being constructed to adjust to the predominant 
dispositions of the linguistic habitus in its wider sense, as invoked by Bourdieu. Men and 
women, Caucasians and people of colour, straight and gay individuals are carrying themselves 
differently in the semiotic world of postures, gestures, walking, speech and laughter. These 
behavioural schemes are encoded in speech acts and reproduced through history by virtue of 
social organisation and education systems. However, critical movements reveal those hidden 
hexes and habitus within the dominant legal settings. They move us to question the adequacy 
of the legal narratives reproduced by judges to adjust white heterosexual male dispositions. In 
this sense, the perception of language by critical scholars is essentially post-structuralist. 
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There is no ideal speaker suitable for legal neutrality. Words are not neutral utterances. 
Language carries a value as established by a dominant group.  
 
B. Critique of the postmodern instrumentalisation  
 
The label viewpoint neutralist references the opponents of perfomative insights into 
the harms of hate speech, which are traced back to different legal backgrounds. Such wording 
tackles their appraisal of speech from an allegedly neutral viewpoint; that is, alienation from 
content. All of them are critical of the victim-based approach to free speech and, therefore, 
advocate the rights of the speaker rather than the rights of the audience.53 Drawing on the 
ethos of Anglo-Saxon utilitarianism and John Stuart Mill’s vision of censorship, their position 
is akin to a de-contextualised interpretation of Voltaire’s claimed statement: “je déteste ce que 
vous écrivez, mais je donnerai ma vie pour que vous puissiez continuer à écrire”.54 The 
underlying idea of such a critique is that it is in the essence of speech to cause embarrassment 
or even hurt. If we begin singling out specific emotional effects, we may end up by silencing 
speech through punishment or a kind of chilling effect. It is impossible to speak critically 
without causing distress to someone.  
 
As illustrated above, the postmodern critique of absolutist free speech also refers to 
silencing, but that silencing is of the opposite nature. It is akin to the suppression mechanism 
of speech acts as deeply rooted in the history of discrimination.  
 
As Barendt points out:  
 
“[Silencing argument] does not make clear how hate speech silences its victims. It makes them less 
inclined to speak or render their speech less effective, but it does not inhibit their legal freedom to 
communicate their views, in particular their right to reply to racist abuse. Hate speech does not infringe 
equality in the same way that a discriminatory refusal to allocate housing or provide education to 
members of the target group clearly does […].”55  
 
                                                 
53
 Other popular labels include civil libertarians and viewpoint absolutists. 
54
 “I disapprove of what you write, but I will defend to the death your right to write it”; whose attribution to 
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Thus, Barendt seems to be critical of the idea of the inter-changeability of speech and 
conduct, which is often pertinent to hate speech.56 Such evidence is, indeed, difficult to 
establish without specific reference to the context and history of racial, sexual or homophobic 
oppression. Such an approach shadows the victim-based narratives introduced by critical 
studies. Hate speech can silence or establish subordination, whether hierarchical, as in the 
case of a teacher at school or the boss of a firm, or community-based, when a black or gay 
family is living in a small conservative town in Utah with a predominantly white middle-class 
population that is adherent to some radical protestant system of beliefs.57  
 
Baez maintains that the debate between abstract principles and contexts reduced the 
question of hate speech to juridical dichotomies: “speech versus equality, the First 
Amendment versus the Fourteenth Amendment, injury to victims versus injury to democracy, 
and so forth”.58 Civil libertarians argue that, even if racist speech disappears, discrimination 
will remain and that, moreover, banning speech may aggravate racism. Others, like Sadurski 
in his critique of MacKinnon, suggest that “the corollary of [the silencing] argument is that 
the hearers are not responsible of the views which they form in their mind about various racial 
groups because they are shaped in that way by the speakers” and that “they are being seen as 
thoughtless receivers of ideas imposed upon them by speakers”.59 
 
Richard Posner suggests a curious analogy between critical jurisprudence and non-
market behaviour. Consequently, he attacks the language of postmodern instrumentalisation 
as excessively pragmatic.  
 
“Postmodernism is what I am calling its historical aspect has affinities with the economics of non-
market behaviour, because both disciplines study the effects of material developments on thought and 
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are sceptical of idealising pictures of social practices, such as language and reputation. [...] 
Postmodernism is the excess of pragmatism. Postmodernists are not merely anti-metaphysical, which is 
fine, but also anti-theoretical. Almost all of them are infected by the virus of political correctness, as 
well. And, though with notable exceptions, they write in an ugly, impenetrable jargon, sometimes with 
the excuse that to write clearly is to buy into the Enlightenment mythology of unmediated 
communication between author and reader.”60  
 
Notwithstanding the rationale behind Posner’s position, it is necessary to acknowledge 
that his ‘critique of crits’ is at places equally strained and oversimplified. Thus, in establishing 
a target example of critical legal writings, he trivialises a book on the legal history of Ireland, 
from which he seems to draw his conclusions on the obscurity and fuzziness of the 
postmodern style, which he sees as pregnant with meaningless metaphors and oxymorons. 
This manner of picking and choosing does not prevent the author from abusing metaphorical 
contextualisation, while remaining irritated with the aesthetics of a new academic language.61 
Besides, Posner’s beloved methodology of law and economics is a genetic sibling of the very 
postmodern movements that he critices.62 Quod licet Iovi, non licet bovi?63  
 
Since the middle of the 1990s, there have been a series of curious academic debates 
about hate speech between the ‘crits’ or scholars of postmodern deconstructionism and the so-
called absolutists or libertarians, their opponents. The most illustrative example of it is to be 
found in the exchange between Richard Delgado and Steven Gey, in which the latter blames 
critical scholars for advocating censorship and the former demonstrates that racial insults 
invite no discourse.64 The list of the ‘critics of the crits’ also includes the communitarians with 
an often quoted piece by Amitai Etzioni65, whose position can be compared to the adage that 
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“sticks and stones may break my bones but words will never harm me”.66 Etzioni essentially 
suggests that the condemnatory communitarian response from civil society -also exercising its 
First Amendment rights- is sufficient and instead advocates education projects, informal and 
formal seminars, discussions and film sessions on campuses.67 On the surface, this position 
looks quite superficial. Etzioni himself gives the example of a T-shirt that reads “Club 
Faggots, Not Seals”. The resultant question is whether sound communitarians should submit 
themselves to a community in which they are regularly taunted on the basis of their race, 
sexual orientation or disability.  
 
An important question that the postmodern deconstruction of the right to free speech 
introduces is to which degree a racist, sexist or homophobic context is stable over time. If 
such environments are a distinctive feature of American society, with its ‘melting pot’ ethos, 
then the marketplace epistemology may be plausible. If the pertinence of racism has been 
increased by the absolutist viewpoint on free speech, the dominant approach of the Supreme 
Court in hate speech cases may recall Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his own son, 
indicating a similar ardour before the godlike altar of the First Amendment.68 At least, one 
thing is certain. In the past 20 years, the American free-speech debate has produced a series of 
legal narratives based on post-Marxist, post-colonial, post-structuralist ideas that are 
indispensable to the genuine appraisal of the right to freedom of expression in a democracy.   
 
C. Transatlantic perspective: Postmodern language for European law?  
 
Given that the origin of American critical studies is deeply rooted in the history of 
European social thinking -particularly in post-structuralism and the Frankfurt school-, the 
postmodern legal techniques are likely to be a part of the contemporary debate on freedom of 
expression in Europe. However, it may seem surprising that postmodern deconstruction is not 
as distinctive in European human rights texts as it is in the USA.69 In addition, the whole 
school of critical race theory seems absent from the European academic space.  
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One might advance several explanations for this. First, the whole instruction system in 
law schools across the Atlantic is different. In the USA, it is common to attend a college at 
which one majors in literature or social sciences before entering law school. Consequently, a 
future legal scholar is more likely to employ quasi-literary modes of interpreting legal texts. 
Secondly, the Anglo-Saxon system of case quotation arguably contributes to a culture of 
constant literary reinterpretation that is foreign to the civil law tradition. Thirdly, the Reagan 
and Bush judiciary design has actually provoked an emphasis on critical jurisprudence in law 
schools. Meanwhile, the European human rights agenda has been essentially driven by the 
ethos of the European Court of Human Rights, whose stance on racism, sexism and 
homophobia has been based on non-discrimination rather than on absolute free speech. The 
approach to hate speech in Europe is radically different from its American counterpart.70 
Moreover, in terms of ‘parallel constitutional timing’, one cannot help but be struck by the 
thought that the Supreme Court seriously discussed the rationale for interracial marriage bans 
in the 1960s or finally decriminalised homosexuality as late as 2003, whereas several 
European countries had already introduced the option of legal partnerships or marriages for 
same-sex couples. Fourthly, the entire post-war discussion on racism in Europe and the USA 
is substantially different. In Europe, in the second half of the 20th century, ‘race’ is almost an 
instinct notion, a rhetorical device with a quasi-shameful character. The post-war European 
community remains sceptical to any attempt at revitalising a scientific notion of race and 
focuses instead on cultural and institutional racism. Contemporary European discussions of 
racism often address ethnicity, the intersectional debate on immigrants and Muslims, along 
with traditional themes of anti-Semitism and anti-Roma hate speech. Meanwhile, the history 
of racial segregation in the USA continues to manifest itself in the rhetorical dichotomies of 
‘blacks’ and ‘whites’, ‘Latinos’, ‘first nations’ and ‘Asian Americans’ in popular culture, 
official censuses, statistics, presidential campaigns, and so on. The colour-blindness of 
American law does not have its explicit analogue in Europe.     
 
Nonetheless, although racist and sexist hate speech seems to have been judicially 
defeated in Europe, it is far from remaining a danger for American society alone. As Boyle 
sharply points out, hate speech was once central to European culture. 
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“There were no ‘hate groups’ espousing racism and white superiority when it was in fact the official 
ideology of mainstream idea. Today’s racists wear out cast-offs, and we have a responsibility for what is 
done with those cast-offs.”71 
 
Similarly, anti-Semitism, which had its apotheosis during the Holocaust, is rooted in 
centuries of prejudice in Europe. For many years after the Second World War, there was a 
certain consensus among Europeans regarding the inadmissibility of particular utterances. 
Nowadays, however, Europe has entered into a vehement debate, regarding such issues as 
immigration, the status of Muslims, and the integration of the Roma community. The rise of 
xenophobia is another troublesome sign, with (recently deceased) Jörg Haider in Austria, 
Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, the Front national in 
France, and Lega Nord in Italy, to name but a few. Recent elections in the traditionally liberal 
Netherlands and Sweden also indicated a rise in anti-migration populism. Furthermore, 
homophobia remains undefeated in both old EU member states and Central and Eastern 
European countries; in particular, Poland, Serbia and practically all post-Soviet countries. The 
recent appearance of European texts within the realm of the postmodern instrumentalisation of 
free speech72 is, therefore, an exciting indication of the potential for the transatlantic migration 
of postmodern constitutional ideas.  
 
This leads to the question of what exactly can be incorporated into the European 
scholarship on human rights from the postmodern instrumentalisation of free speech. The true 
novelty of the critical jurisprudence stemming from European post-structuralism lies in its 
form, which can be aptly described as literary. As convincingly demonstrated by Posner, the 
peculiar ‘narratology’ of the postmodern legal movement works by means of two rhetorical 
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modes; namely, history and literary technique.73 The literary mode, illustrated by victim 
storytelling, literary methods of conveying arguments, quotations or even poetry, is combined 
with a historical account of group subordination and the disadvantages that may accompany 
the European shift from race to ethnicity. Thus, the rhetorical turn in which American scholars 
are engaging may have universal implications for human rights narratology and, particularly, 
for affirmative action and constitutional dialogue agendas. In the context of speech advocacy, 
postmodern instrumentalisation plays a remarkable role within civil rights organisations like 
anti-racist, feminist and LGBT organisations. They act as the principal plaintiffs before 
tribunals with group claims. The academic reception of this peculiar critical narratology in 
Europe is indispensable to the shaping of a new victim-centred doctrine, a civil rights space 
and necessary actors for processing free speech cases before courts and revealing the enigmas 
of law’s neutrality.   
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